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DOI | 10.1016/J.GEB.2012.03.004 | ||||
Año | 2012 | ||||
Tipo | artículo de investigación |
Citas Totales
Autores Afiliación Chile
Instituciones Chile
% Participación
Internacional
Autores
Afiliación Extranjera
Instituciones
Extranjeras
The concept of rationalizability has been used in the last fifteen years to study stability of equilibria in models with a continuum of agents such as competitive markets, macroeconomic dynamics and currency attacks. However, rationalizability has been formally defined in general settings only for games with a finite number of players. We propose an exploration of rationalizability in the context of games with a continuum of players. We deal with a special class of these games, in which payoff of each player depends only on his own strategy and on an aggregate value: the state of the game, which is obtained from the complete action profile. We define the sets of point-rationalizable states and rationalizable states. For the case of continuous payoffs and compact strategy sets, we characterize these sets and prove their convexity and compactness. We provide as well results on the equivalence of point- and standard-rationalizability. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Ord. | Autor | Género | Institución - País |
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1 | Jara-Moroni, Pedro | Hombre |
Universidad de Santiago de Chile - Chile
Instituto Sistemas Complejos de Ingeniería - Chile |
Fuente |
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Universidad de Chile |
Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico |
Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo CientÃfico, Tecnológico y de Innovación Tecnológica |
Departamento de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas, Universidad de Santiago de Chile |
Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Ingeniería |
Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de IngenierÃa |
Departamento de Investigaciones CientÃficas y Tecnológicas, Universidad de Santiago de Chile |
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères |
Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de la Santé |
College de France |
Fondation du Collège de France |
Agradecimiento |
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1 I would like to thank Ali Khan and Thomas Boulogne, for helpful conversations; Bruno Strulovici and Nicolás Figueroa for pointing out to me relevant references; Leonardo J. Basso and Sergio Jara-Díaz for their careful reading of the manuscript; and the audiences at the seminars at PSE, Department of Mathematical Engineering (DIM) of the University of Chile and Economics at Johns Hopkins University, as well as the audiences at the Franco–Chilean Congress on Optimization, Chilean Economic Society Meeting, Chilean–Brazilian Workshop on Economic Theory, Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society and of the European Meeting of the Econometric Society for their valuable questions and remarks. I am especially grateful to two anonymous referees whose constructive criticism and suggestions contributed significantly to improving the presentation of the main contributions of the paper. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from FONDECYT Project 11100259 and DICYT project 031062JM; as well as from Centro de Modelamiento Matemático and Departamento de Ingeniería Matemática of Universidad de Chile, Instituto Sistemas Complejos de Ingeniería (ICM: P-05-004-F), Collège de France and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. |